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Can Your Company Brain Actually Forget? What the Right to Erasure Really Means for AI Memory

Henri Jung, Co-founder at Superkind
Henri Jung

Co-founder at Superkind

A dark metal filing drawer with one card being cleanly pulled out and an orange accent, representing erasing one person from a company memory

On 18 February 2026, the European Data Protection Board published the results of its largest coordinated audit of the right to erasure ever conducted: 764 organisations examined across 32 authorities in the European Economic Area, with nine authorities opening or continuing formal investigations as a result1. The verdict on how European companies handle deletion requests was blunt - overall compliance is only “average,” with recurring failures in procedures, retention, backups, and the misuse of anonymisation as a stand-in for deletion1.

That report landed at an awkward moment. The same companies being audited are racing to build AI memory - a company brain that remembers every email, every ticket, every customer note, so that AI can actually know the business. A memory that remembers everything is exactly what the right to erasure was written to interrupt. When a customer, an employee, or a job applicant asks you to delete their data, a system designed never to forget has a problem it was not built to solve.

This article is for the CTO, data protection officer, or Geschaeftsfuehrer who is building an AI knowledge layer and needs it to survive contact with Article 17. It covers what erasure legally requires, why it is genuinely hard when personal data is encoded across embeddings, backups, and derived context, and how to architect a company brain that can forget one person on request without wiping out what the whole company knows.

TL;DR

The right to erasure applies to AI memory - if your company brain holds personal data, Article 17 reaches every copy of it, not just the original document.

Erasure is technically hard because a memory layer scatters personal data across embeddings, summaries, caches, logs, and backups, often with no link back to the person.

The EDPB is enforcing - its February 2026 report rated compliance “average” and singled out backups, retention, and fake anonymisation as the weak points.

Deletion by design is the fix: tag every piece of personal data with an identity and a retention rule on day one, so forgetting a person is a routine operation.

You can forget one person and keep the knowledge - a well-built brain deletes the individual while preserving the anonymised process and lesson, so institutional memory survives.

The Forgetting Problem Nobody Designed For

The whole promise of a company brain is that it does not forget. Staff leave, memories fade, files get lost, but the brain keeps the process, the decision, and the context. That is a genuine advantage right up until a person exercises a right that the law has guaranteed them since 2018 - the right to have their personal data erased.

  • A memory layer copies data everywhere - One customer email does not sit in one place. It is stored, embedded into vectors, summarised into context, cached for speed, and written into logs. A deletion request has to reach every one of those copies.
  • The link back to the person is often missing - Once text becomes an embedding in a vector index, there is frequently no identifier tying that vector to the individual, which makes finding their data a search problem rather than a lookup.
  • Anonymisation is quietly overused - The EDPB found controllers relying on weak or reversible anonymisation instead of real deletion, which does not satisfy Article 17 if the person can still be re-identified1.
  • Backups are treated as untouchable - Half of the participating authorities flagged deleting data from backups as a specific weak point, because teams assume an archive is out of scope. It is not13.
  • Nobody tests it until it is real - Most teams discover the gaps in their erasure process only when the first serious request arrives and they cannot answer it within the one-month legal window7.

Key Data Point

The EDPB assessed 764 controllers across 32 EEA authorities and rated overall right-to-erasure compliance as “average.” Seven recurring failings were named, and backup deletion and over-reliance on anonymisation were among the most common1. This is no longer a theoretical risk - it is an active enforcement priority for 2026.

The uncomfortable truth is that most AI memory is built for accumulation, not subtraction. Deletion was an afterthought, if it was thought of at all. That gap is what the rest of this article closes.

Where a Person’s Data Ends UpEasy to Delete?Why It Gets Missed
Source document or recordUsually yesThe obvious copy - teams stop here
Vector embeddingsOften noNo identifier links the vector to the person
Summaries and derived contextRarelyThe name is baked into generated text
Caches and search indexesSometimesRebuilt copies fall outside the delete script
Logs and audit trailsAwkwardDeleting logs can break other compliance duties
BackupsHardArchives are wrongly assumed to be out of scope

What Article 17 Actually Requires

Before solving the technical problem, it helps to be precise about the legal one. The right to erasure is Article 17 of the GDPR, and it is narrower and more specific than the popular phrase “right to be forgotten” suggests6.

When a person can demand erasure

Article 17(1) gives a person the right to have their data deleted without undue delay in six defined situations6.

  • No longer necessary - The data is no longer needed for the purpose it was collected for.
  • Consent withdrawn - Processing relied on consent and the person takes that consent back.
  • Objection upheld - The person objects under Article 21 and there is no overriding legitimate ground to continue.
  • Unlawful processing - The data was processed unlawfully in the first place.
  • Legal obligation - Erasure is required to comply with an EU or member-state legal duty.
  • Children’s data - The data was collected from a child in the context of online services.

The exceptions that let you keep data

Erasure is not absolute. Article 17(3) lets you retain data where it is genuinely needed, and getting these boundaries right matters as much as deleting6.

  • Freedom of expression - Where processing is needed for the right to free expression and information.
  • Legal obligation or public task - Where a law requires you to keep the data, such as tax or accounting retention periods.
  • Public health - Certain processing in the public interest in the area of public health.
  • Archiving, research, statistics - Where deletion would seriously impair legitimate archiving or scientific work.
  • Legal claims - Where the data is needed to establish, exercise, or defend legal claims.

The Detail Teams Miss

Article 17(2) goes further than deleting your own copy. If you have made the personal data public or shared it, you must take reasonable steps to tell other controllers processing it that the person has requested erasure of any links to, copies of, or replications of that data6. In a connected AI stack, “copies and replications” is a very large surface.

The clock and the cost

  • One month to respond - You must act on a request without undue delay and in any case within one month, extendable by two further months for complex cases if you tell the person why7.
  • No charge in normal cases - You cannot charge a fee for a standard erasure request.
  • You have to confirm it is done - The person is entitled to know their request has been actioned, which means you need to be able to show it.
  • The fines are top-tier - Breaching Article 17 falls in the higher GDPR penalty band, up to 20 million euros or 4 percent of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher8.
ObligationWhat It Means in PracticeReference
Delete without undue delayActual removal, not hiding or deactivatingArt. 17(1)6
Respond within one monthA hard deadline, only limited extensionArt. 12(3)7
Inform other controllersChase copies and replications you sharedArt. 17(2)6
Respect the exceptionsKeep only what a law or claim justifiesArt. 17(3)6
Face the higher fine tierUp to 20M euros or 4% of global turnoverArt. 83(5)8

Why Erasure Is Genuinely Hard in an AI Memory Layer

The law says delete the personal data. The engineering reality is that a company brain does not store personal data as one tidy row you can drop. It transforms and scatters it, and each transformation creates a new place a person can hide.

Embeddings are personal data you cannot read

When your brain ingests a document, it converts the text into embeddings - long lists of numbers that capture meaning so AI can search by concept. That vector looks anonymous. It is not.

  • Embeddings can be inverted - Cornell researchers showed a method that reconstructs up to 92 percent of short texts exactly from their embeddings alone, and recovered full names from clinical notes9. An embedding of someone’s data is their data.
  • The link to the person is usually absent - Vectors are stored for similarity search, not for lookup by individual, so there is often nothing that says “these 40 vectors belong to this customer.”
  • Soft deletes leave ghosts - Marking a vector as deleted without removing it can leave it reconstructible in the index, so the data is still there for anyone who can read the store.
  • Re-embedding does not help - If the source is gone but the vectors remain, the personal data remains. Deletion has to hit the vectors, not just the file they came from.

Derived context bakes the name in

A company brain does not just store data, it generates new text from it - summaries, briefings, answers - and a person’s name or details can be welded into that generated content.

  • Summaries inherit the personal data - A summary of a customer thread contains the customer. Delete the thread and the summary still names them.
  • Fine-tuned models memorise - If personal data was baked into a fine-tuned model, IBM Research notes that the sheer size of these models makes isolating and removing specific facts especially difficult10.
  • Unlearning is not deletion - Recent research shows models can appear to forget while their original behaviour is restored with minimal fine-tuning, meaning unlearning often obscures rather than erases11.
  • Filtering the output is not erasure - Blocking a name from appearing in answers is not deleting the underlying data, and regulators treat it as an imperfect workaround, not compliance12.

“True unlearning tries to remove all vestiges of the unwanted information, so that when the model gets a problematic question, it simply doesn’t have the answer.”

- Nathalie Baracaldo, AI Security and Privacy Lead at IBM Research10

This is why erasure has to be an architecture decision, not a script you write after the fact. If you did not plan for it, the data may not be removable at all without rebuilding the store.

Bolting On Deletion vs Building It In

Deletion Bolted On Later

  • ✗ Hunt for the data - manual search across stores each time
  • ✗ Miss derived copies - embeddings and summaries slip through
  • ✗ Cannot prove it - no record of what was removed
  • ✗ Blow the deadline - one month is not long for archaeology

Deletion Built In

  • ✓ Look it up - identity tags make every copy findable
  • ✓ Cascade the delete - one request clears all derived data
  • ✓ Evidence on demand - an erasure log shows what happened
  • ✓ Routine, not crisis - a request is a configuration, not a project

What the EDPB Found in 2026

The right to erasure was the topic of the EDPB’s 2025 Coordinated Enforcement Framework action, and the results published on 18 February 2026 turned a legal principle into a concrete enforcement agenda for the year ahead15.

  • The scale was unprecedented - 764 controllers, from SMEs to multinationals, assessed by 32 authorities across the EEA in the largest coordinated erasure audit to date1.
  • Compliance was rated average - Not failing, but far from good, with the same problems appearing across countries and sectors1.
  • Procedures were missing - A large share of authorities found controllers had no documented internal procedure for handling erasure requests13.
  • Backups were a common gap - Half of the participating authorities flagged unclear or absent processes for deleting data held in backups13.
  • Anonymisation was misused - Controllers leaned on weak anonymisation as a substitute for deletion, which fails if data can be re-identified1.
  • Follow-up is real - Nine authorities opened or continued formal investigations, and 23 ran fact-finding exercises, so this was not a paper exercise1.

“We very much welcome the publication of the 2025 report, which details actions taken by the DPC, and colleague Supervisory Authorities across the EU/EEA, in 2025 under the CEF.”

- Graham Doyle, Deputy Commissioner at the Data Protection Commission (Ireland)4

The message to any company building AI memory is direct: regulators are now actively checking whether you can delete a person on request, and “we anonymised it” or “it is only in backups” are the exact answers they have marked down.

EDPB FindingWhat It Signals for AI Memory
No internal erasure procedureAd hoc deletion will not survive an audit
Backup deletion gapsYour archive strategy needs a beyond-use rule
Weak anonymisationRe-identifiable data is still personal data
Unclear retention periodsEvery data type needs a defined lifetime
Poor information to individualsPeople must know how to ask and what happens

Can your AI memory delete a person on request?

Book a 30-minute call. We will map where personal data lives in your stack and test one real erasure end to end.

Book a Demo →
A single dark metal token lifted out of a dense grid of identical tokens, representing removing one person from a company memory layer

Deletion by Design: Architecting a Brain That Can Forget

The fix is not a clever delete script. It is designing the memory so that removing a person is a planned, routine operation from the first day, the same way you design for security or backups. Here is what that looks like in practice.

  1. Tag identity at ingestion - The moment any personal data enters the brain, attach the person and source it belongs to. Every embedding, summary, and cache entry inherits that tag, so later you look data up instead of hunting for it.
  2. Attach a retention rule to everything - No piece of personal data enters without a defined lifetime and a lawful basis. Data with no reason to exist expires on its own, shrinking the surface a request has to cover.
  3. Make derived data point home - Summaries, embeddings, and generated context keep a reference to their source records, so deleting the source cascades to everything derived from it.
  4. Delete hard, not soft - Removal means the vector and the text are gone from the index, not flagged as hidden, so nothing reconstructible is left behind.
  5. Give backups a beyond-use rule - You cannot always edit an archive, so mark the data to be excluded from any restore and re-deleted if a backup is ever brought back, then let the backup age out15.
  6. Keep humans and AI reading the same store - When there is one governed memory rather than ten shadow copies in inboxes and chat tools, there is one place to delete from.
  7. Test erasure like you test restores - Run a real deletion end to end on a schedule. An erasure process you have rehearsed is one you can complete inside the one-month window.

Deletion-by-Design Checklist

  • Every piece of personal data carries an identity tag from the moment it enters the brain
  • Every data type has a defined retention period and a lawful basis
  • Embeddings and summaries reference the source they were derived from
  • Deletion removes vectors and text, not just a visibility flag
  • Backups have a documented beyond-use and re-deletion rule
  • No critical knowledge depends on a fine-tune that memorised personal data
  • One erasure request cascades across source, embeddings, summaries, caches, and logs
  • You have run at least one full erasure test end to end

None of this makes the brain worse at its job. It makes the brain trustworthy, which is the precondition for putting real company knowledge into it at all.

Design ChoiceMemory Built for AccumulationMemory Built for Deletion by Design
Finding a person’s dataManual search across storesDirect lookup by identity tag
Derived copiesOrphaned, easy to missLinked to source, deleted together
VectorsSoft-deleted, still reconstructibleHard-removed from the index
BackupsAssumed out of scopeBeyond-use rule with re-deletion
Proof of erasureNoneAn auditable erasure log

Forgetting One Person Without Losing Institutional Knowledge

Here is the fear that makes companies hesitate: if we delete a customer, do we lose everything we learned from working with them? The answer, with the right design, is no - because the person and the knowledge are two different things.

Separate the individual from the institutional

  • Personal data is the person - Their name, contact details, the content of their messages, anything that identifies them. This is what Article 17 requires you to erase.
  • Institutional knowledge is yours - The process your team followed, the reason a decision was made, the general lesson learned. Stripped of identifiers, this is usually not personal data at all.
  • The pattern survives the person - “Customers in this segment churn when onboarding takes over two weeks” is knowledge you keep. The specific customer who taught you that can be erased.
  • An exception becomes a rule - How your team handled an unusual claim is a reusable process. It does not need the claimant’s identity to remain valuable.

The Core Move

A brain designed for erasure captures the anonymised lesson separately from the identifiable person. When the erasure request comes, you remove the individual and their data, and the institutional pattern - now containing no personal data - stays in the memory. The company forgets the person and keeps the knowledge, which is exactly what both the law and the business want.

Where this makes the difference

  1. A departing employee - Their personal file is erased, but the process they documented, the supplier quirks they logged, and the way they solved a recurring problem stay in the brain for the next person.
  2. A former customer - Their contact history and personal details go, while the anonymised insight about how that type of deal was won or lost remains.
  3. A rejected applicant - Their application data is deleted on schedule, but the calibrated understanding of what a strong profile looks like is retained without any identifiers.
  4. A closed supplier relationship - Personal contacts are removed, while the negotiated terms and the lessons about that category of supplier persist.

Deleting the Person vs Deleting the Knowledge

What Erasure Should Remove

  • ✓ Names and contact details - direct identifiers
  • ✓ Message content - emails, notes, tickets about the person
  • ✓ Embeddings of that content - the vectors that encode it
  • ✓ Summaries naming the person - derived text with identifiers

What Should Survive

  • • The process followed - stripped of personal data
  • • The decision rationale - why, not who
  • • The general lesson - the reusable pattern
  • • Aggregated statistics - counts that identify no one

Provable Erasure, Retention Policies, and EU Soil

Deleting the data is half the job. The other half is being able to show you did it, on the terms the regulator now expects after the 2026 report singled out weak procedures and evidence1.

Prove it with an erasure log

  • Record the event, not the person - Log that a request arrived, what categories were deleted, from which systems, and when - using a reference rather than storing the personal data again.
  • Make deletion auditable - An erasure log turns an unverifiable claim into an event a supervisory authority can check, which is what most audited controllers could not produce13.
  • Confirm back to the person - Article 17 expects you to action the request and be able to confirm it, so the log doubles as your response evidence6.
  • Track the cascade - The log should show the delete reached derived data, not just the source record.

Retention policies do half the work for you

  • Define a lifetime per data type - When data expires automatically, most personal data never lives long enough to become an erasure problem.
  • Map lawful basis to retention - Tax and accounting data has a legally required retention period; a casual enquiry does not. Encode that difference.
  • Default to delete - Keep data because a rule says to, not because deleting it never occurred to anyone.
  • Review retention as an operation - Retention that is written down but never enforced is exactly the gap the EDPB found across sectors1.

Why EU Soil Matters Here

When your company brain runs on EU infrastructure under your own governance, you hold the retention rules and the deletion keys, and you are not waiting on a provider in another jurisdiction to honour a request. Data residency does not satisfy Article 17 on its own, but it removes a dependency that otherwise makes proving erasure much harder. For a deeper look, see our piece on running a sovereign company brain on EU soil.

CapabilityWithout ItWith It
Erasure logCannot prove deletion happenedEvery erasure is an auditable event
Retention rulesData piles up indefinitelyMost data expires before it is ever requested
Identity taggingDeletion is a manual searchDeletion is a direct lookup
EU data residencyDependent on a third-party jurisdictionKeys and rules under your control

How Superkind Fits

Superkind builds a company brain and AI employees on top of the systems you already use, and the brain is architected so that forgetting a person is a routine operation rather than a rebuild. Deletion, retention, and provable erasure are part of the design, not features bolted on after an audit.

  • Deletion by design - Personal data carries an identity tag and a retention rule from the moment it enters the brain, so a request becomes a lookup, not a hunt.
  • Cascading erasure - Removing a person clears the source, the embeddings, the derived summaries, and the caches together, not just the obvious copy.
  • Institutional knowledge preserved - The anonymised process and lesson stay in the brain when the individual is deleted, so you forget the person and keep what you learned.
  • Provable erasure - An erasure log records what was deleted, from where, and when, giving you the evidence the EDPB found most controllers lacked.
  • Retention built in - Every data type has a defined lifetime and a lawful basis, so most personal data expires long before anyone has to request it.
  • Runs on EU soil - The knowledge layer can run on EU infrastructure under your governance, so the deletion keys and retention rules stay with you.
  • Sits on top of your stack - It connects to email, Teams, SharePoint, CRM, and ERP as one governed memory, so there is one place to delete from instead of ten shadow copies.
  • No rip-and-replace - Nothing gets torn out; the brain is a layer over the systems you already run, and it gets sharper as your team uses it.
ApproachGeneric AI Memory ToolSuperkind Company Brain
Deleting a personManual, incompleteOne request, cascading erasure
Derived dataOrphaned embeddings and summariesLinked to source, deleted together
Institutional knowledgeLost with the personAnonymised pattern retained
Proof of erasureNoneAuditable erasure log
Data locationOften outside the EUEU soil under your governance
IntegrationAnother silo to manageOne layer over existing systems

Superkind

Pros

  • ✓ Erasure-ready by design - forgetting a person is routine, not a project
  • ✓ Keeps institutional knowledge - deletes the person, keeps the lesson
  • ✓ Provable erasure - an auditable log for regulators
  • ✓ EU soil - deletion keys and retention rules stay with you
  • ✓ No rip-and-replace - one layer over your existing systems

Cons

  • ✗ Not a self-serve app - requires engagement with our team
  • ✗ Needs process access - we map where personal data really lives
  • ✗ Overkill for a single task - a one-off automation may not need a brain
  • ✗ Governance is a shared effort - retention rules reflect your legal reality, set with you

Is Your Company Memory Erasure-Ready? A Decision Framework

Use these signals to judge how exposed your AI memory is to the next erasure request, and what to do about it.

SignalWhat It MeansAction
You cannot list where a person’s data livesDeletion will be incomplete by defaultMap personal data across every store, including embeddings
Your vectors have no identity tagsFinding a person in the index is a search, not a lookupTag data with person and source at ingestion
You rely on anonymisation to complyRe-identifiable data is still personal dataUse real deletion, keep only truly anonymised patterns
Backups are assumed out of scopeA key EDPB failing - archives are in scopeAdd a documented beyond-use and re-deletion rule
You cannot prove a past deletionAn audit would find nothing to checkIntroduce an erasure log for every request
You have never tested a real requestThe gaps are unknown until it is too lateRun one erasure end to end within the month window

Designing for Erasure Now vs Waiting

Building It In Now

  • ✓ Cheaper while small - less accumulated data to untangle later
  • ✓ Audit-ready - you can answer a regulator on the first request
  • ✓ Trust to build on - safe to put real knowledge in the brain
  • ✓ Deadline-proof - one month is plenty when it is routine

Waiting

  • ✗ Data compounds - more scattered copies to find later
  • ✗ Enforcement is live - the EDPB is actively investigating now
  • ✗ Rebuild risk - retrofitting deletion can mean rebuilding the store
  • ✗ Trust deficit - teams hold back knowledge from a brain they do not trust

Frequently Asked Questions

The right to erasure, also called the right to be forgotten, lets a person ask a company to delete their personal data in defined situations - for example when the data is no longer needed, when consent is withdrawn, or when it was processed unlawfully. The company usually has one month to respond and must actually delete the data, not just hide it. Article 17 also lists exceptions, such as data kept to meet a legal obligation or to defend a legal claim.

Yes. If a company memory or company brain holds personal data - names, emails, customer notes, ticket histories - that data is subject to Article 17 like any other store. The awkward part is that a memory layer copies, embeds, summarises, and caches that data in many places, so a single deletion request can touch far more than one database row. Erasure has to reach every derived copy, not just the original document.

Text is turned into numeric vectors called embeddings, and those vectors are spread across an index with no obvious link back to the person. Research from Cornell showed embeddings can be inverted to reconstruct up to 92 percent of short texts exactly, including full names, so an embedding is personal data even without the original text. If you do not tag each vector with a person or document ID at the moment you create it, finding and removing that person later is slow, incomplete, or impossible.

Not automatically. The EDPB found in 2026 that many organisations lean on weak anonymisation as a substitute for deletion, and if the data can still be re-identified it is not anonymous and not erased. Real anonymisation has to be irreversible. If a determined party could link the data back to a person, regulators treat it as pseudonymised personal data that still falls under Article 17.

Backups are in scope, but regulators accept that you cannot always surgically edit a backup archive. The common approach is to put the restored data beyond use - flag it so it is excluded from any restore and re-deleted the moment a backup is brought back online - and to let the backup age out on its normal retention cycle. What you cannot do is treat a backup as a quiet permanent copy that survives every erasure request.

In February 2026 the EDPB published the results of its 2025 coordinated action, drawing on 764 controllers across 32 authorities in the EEA. It rated overall compliance as average and named seven recurring problems, including missing internal procedures, weak information to individuals, over-reliance on anonymisation, unclear retention periods, and difficulty deleting data in backups. Nine authorities opened or continued formal investigations off the back of it.

Deletion by design means building the memory so that removing a person is a planned, routine operation rather than an archaeology project. Every piece of personal data carries an identity tag and a retention rule from the moment it enters the brain, derived copies point back to their source, and a single erasure request cascades through embeddings, summaries, caches, and logs. You design for forgetting on day one, not after the first request arrives.

Yes, if it separates person-level data from institutional knowledge. A departing customer is entitled to have their personal data removed, but the process the team followed, the reason a decision was made, and the general lesson learned are the company’s own knowledge and usually contain no personal data once the individual identifiers are stripped. A well-built brain deletes the person and keeps the anonymised pattern, so institutional memory survives the erasure.

You keep an erasure log: a record that a request came in, what was deleted, from which systems, and when. The log itself stores no personal data beyond a reference, so it does not recreate the problem. Provable erasure turns a deletion from an unverifiable claim into an auditable event, which is exactly what supervisory authorities asked for after the 2026 report found most controllers could not evidence their process.

Article 17 breaches sit in the higher fine tier of the GDPR, up to 20 million euros or 4 percent of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Beyond the headline number, the reputational cost of telling a customer their data cannot be deleted is significant. The point of building erasure into the memory layer is that compliance becomes a configuration, not a crisis.

It helps with control. When the knowledge layer runs on EU infrastructure under your governance, you decide the retention rules, you hold the deletion keys, and you are not waiting on a third party in another jurisdiction to honour a request. Data residency does not by itself satisfy Article 17, but it removes a layer of dependency that makes proving erasure much harder.

Start by mapping where personal data lives across your AI stack - source documents, embeddings, summaries, caches, logs, and backups - and testing one real erasure request end to end. Most teams discover the gaps only when they try it. From there you introduce identity tagging and retention rules on new data first, then work back through the existing store, so the brain becomes erasure-ready without a full rebuild.

Henri Jung, Co-founder at Superkind
Henri Jung

Co-founder of Superkind, where he helps SMEs and enterprises deploy custom AI employees that actually fit how their teams work. Henri is passionate about closing the gap between what AI can do and the value it creates in real companies. He believes the Mittelstand has everything it needs to lead in AI - it just needs the right approach, built on a company brain that is trusted enough to hold real knowledge, which means it has to be able to forget on request as cleanly as it remembers.

Ready to build a company brain that can forget on request?

Book a 30-minute call with Henri. We will map where personal data lives in your AI stack and show how deletion by design keeps you compliant without losing what your company knows - no commitment, no sales pitch.

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